Introduction
The main result of this paper is that the set of all weighted Shapley values of a cooperative game contains the core of the game. That there is such a general relationship between core and values is somewhat surprising in light of the difference in concept behind these solutions. Indeed cooperative game theory tells us very little about the relations between core and values. Such relations are known to exist for convex games and for market games with a continuum of players. In such games the Shapley value is always in the core. Convex games have, in a sense, large cores, which 'explains' why they contain the Shapley value. In the case of market games with a continuum of players, it is the homogeneity of the games and the diagonal property of the Shapley value that guarantee this fact.
More relations can be found when we consider core-like and value-like solutions. In a recent paper Owen (1990) shows that for spatial voting games the Copeland winner outcome, which is a near core solution concept, is an analogue of the Shapley value. A result concerning a relation between the core and value-like solutions for general games was noted by Weber (1988) who showed that the set of all random order values of a game contains the core. Our result generalizes Weber's since weighted values constitute a subset (dimensionally, a very small one) of random order values.
Weighted Shapley values (weighted values for short) were defined by Shapley (1953 a, b) alongside the standard Shapley value and were extensively discussed in the literature (e.g., Owen (1972) , Kalai, and Samet (1987) , and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) ). For these values weights are assigned to the players. The value is then determined in one of two equivalent ways. In the random order approach the weights are used to determine a probability distribution over orders of the players and the value is the expected contributions of the players according to this probability distribution. In the algebraic approach the value of a unanimity game is determined first, by allocating one unit among the players of the carrying coalition according to their Shapley (1981) , using the weights explicitly in the axioms, and by Kalai and Samet (1987) without doing so. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) used the potential approach in order to provide new axiomatizations for the weighted values.
Our first results concern convex games. We characterize convex games by a property of the set of all weighted values of a game. We show that the weighted values of a given game are monotonic with respect to the weights if and only if the game is convex. By monotonicity of the weighted values for a given game we mean that when a player's weight is increased, while keeping the other players' weights unchanged, the player's value in the given game increases. The intuition behind this claim is as follows. When we examine the dependence on the weights of the probability distribution over orders we find that by increasing a player's weight we increase his chances to arrive 'late'. Convex games are precisely those games in which a player's contribution increases when he arrives 'late'. Therefore by increasing a player's weight we increase his expected contribution. Using the monotonicity property we prove that a game is convex if and only if its core coincides with the set of all its weighted values. This last result is used together with a fixed-point argument to prove the main result of the paper. The core of any game is a subset of the set of all its weighted values.
The difficulty in studying weighted values stems from the special structure of the family of weighted values as a set of linear operators from the space of games into R y where N is the set of players. The association of each positively weighted value, namely one in which each player has a positive weight, with the corresponding weight vector is a homeomorphism between the positively weighted values and the relative interior of the unit simplex in R N. But, unlike the latter, the set of positively weighted values is not a convex set. Moreover, this natural homeomorphism cannot be extended to one between the closure of the positively weighted values, which is the set of all weighted values, and the unit simplex. This is so because the limit of a sequence of positively weighted values depends on the rate of convergence to zero of different weights.
Each game v can be viewed naturally as a linear transformation from the space of linear solutions to R y. It maps the set of all weighted values to the set of all payoff vectors assigned to v by all the weighted values. The non-trivial structure of the payoff set is inherited from the non-trivial structure of the set of weighted values which is mapped on it linearly by v. Since the set of all weighted values is not convex we cannot expect it to be mapped onto a convex set by a linear mapping, and indeed in general it is not.
The structure of the set of weighted values is best revealed when it is mapped to R N by a strictly convex game. In this case we show that the set of weighted values is mapped homeomorphically onto the core of the game. Moreover, the structure of the core, which was studied by Shapley (1971) is reflected in a natural way in the structure of the set of weighted values.
The set of weighted values can be easily shown to be homeomorphic to the set of conditional systems that was discussed in the literature of non-cooperative game theory (e.g., see Myerson (1986) and Mclennan (1989a, b) ). The main theorem of Mclennan (1989b) states that this set is homeomorphic to a ball. As the core of a strictly convex game is homeomorphic to a ball, this paper provides an independent proof to Mclennan's theorem.
The lack of convexity of the set of weighted values distinguishes it from the much simpler set of random order values. Since the latter is a convex set of values it follows that the set of all random order values of a game is also convex. The proof that this set contains the core requires standard techniques of convex analysis. By contrast, the case of weighted values seems to require heavier tools. The proof of our main result relies on a fixed-point theorem.
Preliminaries
Let N be a finite set with n _> 1 elements which we call players. For xeR N and Se//{ we write x(S) for ~.i~sX~; for S=0, x(S)=0. For a finite set X, A (X) is the unit simplex in R x. We denote by Int(A (X)) the relative interior of A (X).
We denote by ~ the set of all n! (complete) orders on N. The contribution vector z~(r)eR ~v for the game v and the order r is defined by (QruO-v(Q~) for each ieN. Let P be a probability measure over all n! orders of N. i.e., PeA(~). The P-random order value q/(P): GoR N is defined by qf(P) =Ep(z"(.)) for each v~G, where Ep is the expectation with respect to P. That is, q/~(P) = ~ (v(Q~ui)-v(Q~r))P(r) for all v~G and for all ieN.
(2.1)
The structure of the core of a convex game is described in Shapley (1971) 
Positively Weighted Values
For a vector o9 eR N + (i.e., 09 ~> 0), the positively weighted value ~o (o9): G---~R N is defined in Shapley (1953 a) as the unique linear operator satisfying for each unanimity game Us:
Since ~o<')(o9) is linear, (3.1) defines ~v(w) for all reG. Then for every veG, q7~(o9)= q/v(p~). Note that both ~0v(.) and P<.> are positively homogeneous of degree one. Therefore we can restrict our attention to vectors 09 in Int(A (N) ), that will be called weight vectors.
Weighted Values
We generalize now the notion of a weight vector to enable some players to have zero weight. The values corresponding to the generalized weights will be called weighted values. These values were defined by Shapley (1953 b) and axiomatized by Kalai and Samet (1987) . The following consideration will lead us to this generalization.
When zero-weight players are allowed we can not use directly (3.1) to define a value, since for S which contains only zero-weight players (3. I) is not defined. We need therefore to assign secondary weights to the zero-weight players, that will be used for coalitions which contain only zero-weight players. These new secondary weights may themselves assign zeros for some of the players and we have to assign also weights to these doubly zero-weighted players, and so on. We are naturally lead to the following definition.
A generalized weight vector is a 2k-tuple, 1_ k<_n, (St ..... Se, w sl, .... w sk) such that (S1 ..... Sk)~ and wS~Int(A(Sh)) for h = 1 ..... k. The interpretation of the generalized weight vectors is as follows. The players in Sk are the non-zero weight players with weights given by wS% while the rest of the players are zeroweight players. Among the zero-weight players the 'heaviest' are the members of Sk-~ with weights w sk-~. All players in w h_< k--2Sh are zero-weight players relative to players in Sk_ ~, etc. Note that every weight vector o9 can be naturally identified with the generalized weight vector (N, o9).
Given A vector w ~l-[s~A (S) which satifies (4.1) is called a weight system. The set of all weight systems is denoted by ~. We saw that each generalized weight vector corresponds to a weight system. It is easy to see that this correspondence is one to one. We show now that it is also onto ~.
Let weTf and define a(w)~, as follows. Let TI= {i~N:w~>O}, and for h_ 2 we define Th to be the set I i~ (u~--11-Tj)c: wlU}= 1Ty> 0 1 when this set is not empty.
Let Tk be the last nonempty set so defined, then clearly (7"1 ..... Tk) is an ordered partition. Now for each 1 _ h _< k, let Sh = Tk-h + 1 and a (w) = ($1 ..... Sk). It is easy to see now that w is the weight system that corresponds to the generalized weight vector (SI ..... Sk, w s', .... 
wSk).
For a given ae~. we denote by ~ the set of all weight systems w for which a(w)=a. Note that for W~W~.~(N ) iff wN~o, and that ~(N) is dense in ~.
For a given we 7f we define now the weighted value ~o(w) as the linear function r G--*R u which is defined for each unanimity game Us by:
~07~(w)= w s for ieS and O7~(w)=0 otherwise.
Note that for w e ~u) the weighted value 0 (w) coincides with the positively weighted value 0 (wlV). Weighted values are also random order values. The probability distribution Pw in A(~) which defines ~0(w) is described as follows.
We say that an order r of N is consistent with a = ($1, $2 ..... Sk) in ~. if for each 1 <_h<_k-1 each player in Sh precedes each player in Sh+~. For each w~ we define a probability measure Pw over all orders of N, the support of which is the set of all orders which are consistent with a(w). Now let ($1 ..... Sk, w s~ ..... w s~) be the generalized weight vector which corresponds to w. Since wS~Int(A(Sh)) for all 1 <_h<_k, we can define for each such h a probability distribution Pw~* on the orders of Sh in the same way P~ was defined in (3.2). We define now k
p~ (r) = ]-I Pws.(rh),
h=l where rh is the order on Sh induced by r. Pw is the probability distribution for which ~0V(w) = ~v(Pw) for each game v.
Notice that in all the orders which are consistent with a(w), the non-zero players (those in SD are preceded by all other players, all the players in Sk_ 1 are preceded by the players in Wh~_k-zSh etc.
The Main Results
The main theorem is the following:
Theorem A. For every game v, each element in the core of v is the weighted value of v for some weight system. That is, C(v)C_~ov(Tf).
The anti-core AC(v) of the game v is defined to be the set of all x~R N for which x(N) = v(N), and x(S)<_v(S) for all SC_N. The anti-core is a natural solution concept for games that model cost allocation problems. Note that AC(v) = -C(-v) for all v~G. Therefore, Theorem A and the linearity property of the weighted values imply:
Theorem B. For every game v, each element in the anti-core of v is the weighted value of v for some weight system. That is, AC(v) C_q~(Tf ).
More specific results are obtained for convex games.
Theorem C. A game v is convex iff C(v) = Ov(~). Moreover, v is strictly convex iff ~o v is a homeomorphism between 7f and C(v); In this case for each ae~,, ~ maps homeomorphically ~ onto the relative interior of the face F~ of C(v).
A corollary of Theorem C is:
Corollary C. The set 7f of all weight systems on N is homeomorphic to a n -1 dimensional ball, where n is the cardinality of N. Weber (1988) ) and therefore Theorem A implies Weber's result. Moreover, the set of all weighted values has the dimension of 7f which according to Corollary C is n-1. The set of all random order values can be shown to have the dimension 2"-1(n-2)+ 1. Thus Theorem A shows that a much "thiner" set of values is required in order to cover the core of each game. Note also that ~0v(Yf) is not a convex set in general and therefore it is strictly contained in the set ~u v (A (~,~)).
The set 7f has been discussed in the literature of non-cooperative game theory under the title 'the space of conditional systems' (e.g., see Myerson (1986) and Mclennan (1989a, b) ). Condition (4.1) can be phrased as saying that for each S, w s is the conditional probability on S derived from the probability distributions on supersets of S whenever such derivation is possible. The result of Mclennan (1989b) states that ~ is homeomorphic to a ball and it is proved using algebraic topology techniques. Corollary C is an independent proof of this result. It shows that 7f is homeomorphic to the core of any strictly convex game. Convex games can be also characterized by another property of the weighted values.
For every ieN and for every we u in ~ we write w>i u if wS> u s for every S which contains i and w s= u s for all Sc_N\i. We say that ~0 ~ is increasing if for each i, for each ordered partition a, and for each w, u e ~ such that w > i u, ~o~ (w) _> (o7 (u).
( 5.2) q~v is strictly increasing if the inequalities in (5.2) are strict. Proof." It can be easily verified that it suffices to prove that for a convex game v,
for all coeRN+,
and that for a strictly convex game v the inequalities in (6.2) are strict.
Indeed, let f v be the multilinear extension of v as defined by Owen (1972) . Then Note that vh is (strictly) convex whenever v is (strictly) convex, and since w s~ ~>0 and uS~>O the result follows from what we showed for weight systems in ~((N).
We have shown that (strict) convexity of v implies (strict) monotonicity of 9L Conversely, assume ~ is increasing and that v is not convex. Then there exist i~j and Sc {i,j} ~ such that
(6.6)
Consider w such that a(w)=(S, {i,j}, (Suiuj)~).
Then by (6.5) and the formula for computing the positively weighted value for 2-person games, 'jl [v(Swj•O-v(Swj) ] + wJ i'j} [v(SuO-v(S) ].
97(w) = w} i
(6.7)
Consider u defined by u r= w r for each Tr {i,j}, u} ~'j} =w~ ~'j} -~ and uJi'J}= wy "j} + e for small enough e > 0. Clearly w >su and a (u)= a(w). Thus we can write for u an expression similar to (6.7). From (6.6) and (6.7) 9 7 (w) < ~ 7 (u). (6.8) This contradicts the monotonicity of 9 v. If o is assumed not to be a strictly convex game then we can guarantee only weak inequality in (6.6) and therefore weak inequality in (6.8). This is, however, sufficient to contradict strict monotonicity of ~v. This complete the proof of Theorem D. 9 We prove Theorem C through Lemmas 2-4. Suppose v is a convex game and let r e ~ then by Shapley (1971) 
Lemma 4. Let v be a strictly convex game. Then ~o~(7f ) = C(v).
Proof." In what follows we denote the relative interior Of a convex set X by Int(X). Recall that C(v) =F(%). Therefore, by Lemma 2, r maps ~u) into the relative interior of C(v). Since the closure of g/~(u) is ~ and r is continuous, it suffices to prove that O~ To see this note that ~u) is homeomorphic to IntA(N) and therefore, both ~u) and Int(C(v) ) are homeomorphic to R n-1. Since ~0 v is continuous and 1-I, we deduce from the Invariance of Domain Theorem (e.g., see Istratescu (1981) (~N) ). We now show that B is open in Int(C(v) ) and therefore must be empty since Int (C(v) tions on ~,~ that are concentrated on a single order in ~ belong to both families. However, Kalai and Samet (1987) 
Theorem B*. For every game v, each element in the anti-core of v is the dual weighted value of v for some weight system. That is, A C (v) a_ (~o*) ~ (7//).
Observe further that a game v is (strictly) convex iff -v* is (strictly) convex, and that for each game v, ~p-V(~)= _</(~).
Hence, Theorem C implies the next Theorem:
Theorem C*. A game v is convex iff C(v) = (~o*)v(Yf). Moreover, v is strictly convex iff ((o*) ~ is a homeomorphisim between 7f and C(v). In this case for each ae~., (~o*) v maps homeomorphically 7//~ onto the relative interior of the face F~. of C(v), where ~* is ordered partition ~ reversed.
We say that (~p*)~ is decreasing if for each i, for each ordered partition cr, and for each w, ue 7f~ such that w>,-u, (~0") [ (w) _< (~p*) y (u).
(7.1) (~0") ~ is strictly decreasing if the inequalities in (7.1) are strict. Thus we have:
Theorem D*. The game v is (strictly) convex iff (qg*) v is (strictly) decreasing.
Theorems C and C* imply that for convex games v, ~ov(yf) = (~o,)v(~).
We conjecture that the above equality holds for every game v.
